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Abstract
Invalid voting and electoral absenteeism are two important sources of abstention in
compulsory voting systems. Previous studies in this area have not considered the correla-
tion between both variables and ignored the compositional nature of the data, potentially
leading to unfeasible results and discarding helpful information from an inferential stand-
point. In order to overcome these problems, this paper develops a statistical model that
accounts for the compositional and hierarchical structure of the data and addresses ro-
bustness concerns raised by the use of small samples that are typical in the literature.
The model is applied to analyze invalid voting and electoral absenteeism in Brazilian
legislative elections between 1945 and 2006 via MCMC simulations. The results show
considerable differences in the determinants of both forms of non-voting: while invalid
voting was strongly positively related both to political protest and to the existence of im-
portant informational barriers to voting, the influence of these variables on absenteeism
is less evident. Comparisons based on posterior simulations indicate that the model de-
veloped in this paper fits the dataset better than several alternative modeling approaches
and leads to different substantive conclusions regarding the effect of different predictors
on the both sources of abstention.
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1. Introduction 
The desire to provide a political system with popular legitimacy and to increase the 
representativeness of elected public officers have often been asserted as major arguments 
justifying the imposition of compulsory voting provisions (Verba, Nie and Kim, 1978; 
Hill, 2002). Twenty-four countries, comprising approximately 20% of the world’s 
democracies, employ mandatory voting to some extent (Australian Joint Standing 
Committee on Electoral Matters, 2000). Although compulsory voting has been found to 
be an effective mechanism for increasing voter turnout (Hirczy, 1994; Lijphart 1997; 
Fornos, 1996), compelling voters to go to the polls does not automatically mean that they 
will cast a vote for one of the candidates. Citizens can cast invalid votes, i.e., blank or 
null ballots, and thus their right not to vote remains intact (Lijphart, 1997); in fact, a 
long-standing feature of compulsory voting systems is a higher rate of invalid ballots 
(Hirczy, 1994). In addition, since mandatory voting does not generate universal 
compliance (Hirczy, 1994; Power and Roberts, 1995), illegal abstention constitutes a 
second form of non-voting. 
  
Previous research on compulsory voting systems has focused either on the 
determinants of electoral absenteeism (Hirczy, 1994; Fornos, Power and Garand, 2004) 
or on the determinants of invalid voting (McAllister and Makkai, 1993; Power and 
Garand, 2007). The common approach of studies in this area has been to treat the 
proportion of invalid votes or electoral absenteeism as the dependent variable and regress 
each on a set of explanatory variables. This standard procedure exhibits two main 
shortcomings. Fist, it does not take into account the connection between both sources of 
non-voting and the relationship between their determinants. Since, under compulsory 
voting, invalid voting and electoral absenteeism can be seen as “functional equivalents” 
of abstention, jointly modeling them may contribute to better understand abstention and 
its causes. Moreover, without a model for exploring the interrelation between these two 
sources of abstention, helpful information from an inferential standpoint maybe 
discarded because the correlation between them is assumed to be zero, and changes in 
the standard error estimates that might result from a bivariate model could substantially 
 2 
modify the conclusions drawn from separate univariate analyses (Zellner, 1971; Thum, 
1997). Second, the prevailing modeling strategy ignores the “compositional” nature of 
the data (Aitchison, 1986), i.e., the fact that the proportions of invalid ballots, electoral 
absenteeism and votes for candidates or parties among the electorate cannot be negative 
and that must sum one. Ignoring these non-negativity and unit-sum constraints might 
lead to unfeasible results, such as negative percentages of invalid ballots or sums of 
proportions greater or less than one (Katz and King, 1999).  
 
This paper develops a statistical model to address these problems, jointly analyzing 
the determinants of invalid voting and electoral absenteeism in district-level elections. 
While national-level studies have the advantage of allowing more countries in the 
analysis, they are generally based on a small number of observations and may fail to 
capture the contextual and “neighborhood” effects that might have considerable 
influence in local (e.g., legislative) elections (King, 1997; Katz and King, 1999). In 
addition, given the absence of survey data covering large historical periods in many of 
the countries with compulsory voting, most of which are recently democratized Latin 
American nations (International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, IDEA, 
2007), district-level elections allow studying both sources of abstention at the lowest 
possible level of aggregation.  
 
However, analyzing district-level elections introduces an additional methodological 
challenge. The proportion of invalid votes and absenteeism may be influenced not only 
by local variables but also by country-level factors affecting all districts in a given 
election (Power and Roberts, 1995), violating the standard assumption of independent 
and identically distributed errors. Ignoring the hierarchical structure of the data and 
simply pooling national- and district-level variables may thus result in inefficient 
parameter estimates and negatively biased standard errors, potentially leading to 
“spuriously significant” statistical effects (Antweiler, 2001; Maas and Hox, 2004; 
Franzese, 2005).  
 
Drawing on the literature on compositional data (Aitchison and Shen, 1980; 
Aitchison, 1986; Katz and King, 1999), and on multi-level modeling (Goldstein, 1995; 
Bryk and Raudenbush, 2002; Gelman and Hill, 2007), the model presented here relates 
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both sources of abstention in compulsory-voting systems, accounting for the 
compositional and hierarchical structure of the data and addressing robustness concerns 
raised by the use of small samples that are typical in the literature.  I illustrate the use of 
the model analyzing data on invalid voting and electoral absenteeism in Brazil’s lower 
house elections at the state level. Brazil has the largest electorate in the world subject to 
compulsory voting and has experienced considerable variations in institutional, political 
and socioeconomic conditions across history and between states, therefore providing an 
illuminating case to examine rival explanations of invalid voting and absenteeism. The 
percentage of blank and null ballots in the country has been historically larger and more 
volatile than in most other democracies with compulsory voting (Instituto Universitario 
de Pesquisas de Rio de Janeiro, IUPERJ, 2006; IDEA, 2007), and absenteeism has 
remained relatively high despite mandatory voting. 
   
Power and Roberts (1995) used ordinary least square pooled time-series regressions to 
separately analyze the determinants of the two sources of abstention in legislative 
elections between 1945 and 1990, combining country-level and state-level predictors by 
assigning the national variables to each state. I extend the period of analysis to include 
all the elections held up to 2006 and compare the results of the model developed in this 
paper with those obtained from alternative modeling strategies that that fail to account 
for the compositional and/or the hierarchical structure of the data. Based on posterior 
simulations, I show that the compositional-hierarchical model leads to different 
substantive conclusions and fits the data better than these alternative modeling 
approaches. 
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews 
alternative theories for explaining invalid voting and absenteeism under compulsory 
voting systems. Section 3 presents the compositional-hierarchical model developed in 
this paper to analyze the determinants of invalid voting and absenteeism at the district 
level. Section 4 applies the model to analyze 16 lower house elections in Brazil and 
compares the performance of the compositional-hierarchical model with three competing 
approaches.  Finally, Section 5 concludes. 
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2. Alternative explanations of invalid voting and absenteeism 
Drawing on the literature on voter turnout in industrialized democracies, three basic 
explanations, focusing on socioeconomic factors, on institutional variables, and on 
“protest voting”, have been proposed to account for invalid voting and absenteeism in 
compulsory voting systems (McAllister and Makkai, 1993; Power and Roberts, 1995; 
Fornos et al., 2004; Power and Garand, 2007).  
 
Some scholars have argued that the high rate of blank and null ballots in polities with 
mandatory voting reflects the alienation of citizens from the political system and is the 
consequence of mobilizing disinterested and poorly informed citizens who would 
otherwise abstain (Jackman, 2001). Previous analyses (1993; Power and Roberts, 1995; 
Power and Garand, 2007) found that socioeconomic variables such as urbanization, 
literacy and education levels substantially affect the percentage of blank and null ballots 
cast through their effect on the perceived efficacy, access to information and 
development of political skills among the electorate. Although the literature on electoral 
behavior has also found a strong correlation between these variables and political 
participation in voluntary voting settings (Verba et al., 1978; Powell, 1986; Rosenstone 
and Hansen, 1993), empirical evidence from countries with mandatory voting (Power 
and Roberts, 1995; Fornos et al., 2004) suggest that the impact of socioeconomic factors 
on electoral absenteeism in these countries is quite moderate.  
 
Other authors have underscored the role of the institutional context and design in 
explaining invalid voting and absenteeism. For instance, Blais and Dobrzynska (1998) 
and Kostadinova (2003) concluded that a higher number of political parties depress 
turnout by increasing the unpredictability of electoral and policy outcomes, and the same 
would apply for highly disproportional systems that punish minor parties and reduce 
voters’ perceived efficacy (Jackman, 1987; Jackman and Miller, 1995). In the same 
direction, McAllister and Makkai (1993) and Power and Roberts (1995) provide 
evidence that institutional factors such as district magnitude and ballot structures have a 
considerable impact on invalid voting in mandatory voting settings.   
 
Finally, an alternative explanation can be traced to the literature on protest voting 
(Kitschelt, 1995; Lubbers and Scheepers, 2000). A protest vote can be defined as a vote 
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primarily cast to express discontent with politics, rather than to affect public policies 
(Van der Brug and Fennema, 2003). In a system of compulsory voting, citizens’ 
discontent with the political establishment would translate into higher null and blank 
ballots and illegal abstention (Derks and Deschouwer, 1998). This interpretation has 
often been quoted in Brazil and Latin America to explain temporary increases in invalid 
voting and absenteeism (Moisés, 1993; Jocelyn–Holt, 1998; Escobar, Calvo, Calcagno 
and Minvielle, 2002).  
 
Although the socioeconomic, institutional and protest approaches are usually 
presented as competitors rather than as complementary, previous research (Power and 
Roberts, 1995; Fornos et al., 2004) has shown that fusing them in a combined model 
helps to better understand the phenomena under study. However, since these approaches 
are grounded in the literature on political participation in developed democracies, where 
invalid voting has not received much academic attention (Power and Garand, 2007), past 
work has made no theoretical distinctions regarding the effect of the different sets of 
variables on invalid voting and electoral absenteeism. The underlying assumption in 
previous analyses has been that the same basic causal mechanisms account for both 
forms of non-voting (Power and Roberts, 1995), despite considerable variations in their 
relative incidence both across countries and elections (IIDEA, 2007). Furthermore, from 
a methodological perspective, they failed to examine the potential interactions between 
the determinants of these two sources of abstention, implicitly assuming that the effects 
of the relevant predictors on invalid voting are independent of their impacts on 
absenteeism. The statistical model presented in the next section allows me to test these 
assumptions. 
   
3. A statistical model of abstention under compulsory voting  
The model used to analyze the determinants of invalid voting and absenteeism at the 
district level is grounded in the literature on “compositional data” (Aitchison and Shen, 
1980; Aitchison, 1986; Katz and King, 1999) and on Bayesian hierarchical modeling 
(Lindley and Smith, 1972; Gelman and Hill, 2007), although it is modified and adapted 
to the problem under study.  
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Let
,
I
i tP , ,
A
i tP  and ,
V
i tP  denote the proportion of invalid votes, electoral absenteeism and 
valid votes (i.e., votes for candidates or parties) among the electorate in district i  at 
election t ,  i =1,2…. n , , t =1,2…T . For all i  and t , 
,
I
i tP , ,
A
i tP  and ,
V
i tP  must satisfy the 
following non-negativity and unit-sum constraints (Katz and King, 1999):     
     
                                             [ ]
,
0,1 ,       , ,si tP s I A V∈ =                                                 (1) 
                                      
, , ,
1I A Vi t i t i tP P P+ + =                                                               (2). 
 
These constraints determine that 
,
I
i tP , ,
A
i tP  and ,
V
i tP   fall in the simplex space. Figure 1 
illustrates the simplex sample space using a ternary plot for lower house elections in  
Brazil between 1945 and 2006. As seen in the Figure, while ignoring the non-negativity 
and unit-sum constraints in the statistical analysis might not be problematic for some of 
the observations in the sample – e.g., Roraima (RR) in the 1970 election – in most other 
cases - e.g., Amapá (AP), 1954 –, this could lead to unfeasible results, such as negative 
predicted proportions of invalid ballots.  
 
[Figure 1 here]  
 
A model aimed at analyzing the determinants of abstention in compulsory voting 
systems must take the constraints defined in (1) and (2) into account.  Neither the 
standard approach of regressing invalid voting and absenteeism independently on a set of 
predictors nor estimating a system of seemingly unrelated equations satisfies these 
constraints, even if eventually the point predictions obtained happen to fall within the 
boundaries of the simplex (Katz and King, 1999). In order to address this problem, I 
adapt Aitchison’s (1986) and Katz and King’s (1999) models for compositional data 
using a Bayesian implementation of a bivariate mixed model for invalid voting and 
electoral absenteeism.  
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Let ( ), , ,lnI I Vi t i t i tY P P=  and ( ), , ,lnA A Vi t i t i tY P P=  denote the log-ratios of the proportion of 
invalid votes and absenteeism relative to valid votes, respectively.1 Note that, unlike the 
baseline composites
,
I
i tP , ,
A
i tP  and ,
V
i tP , ,
I
i tY  and ,
A
i tY  are unbounded and unconstrained. The 
variables of interest for the analysis, 
,
I
i tP , ,
A
i tP , are obtained from , , ,,
I A
i t i t i tY Y Y =    through 
the additive logistic transformations:  
 
                             
,
,
, ,
exp
1 exp exp
I
i tI
i t I A
i t i t
Y
P
Y Y
  
=
   + +   
                                                    (3) 
                                 
,
,
, ,
exp
1 exp exp
A
i tA
i t I A
i t i t
Y
P
Y Y
  
=
   + +   
                                                     (4) 
 
Since the 
,
,   ,
s
i tY s I A= , are defined over the whole real line, it is possible to model 
, , ,
,
I A
i t i t i tY Y Y =   using a normal/independent distribution (Andrews and Mallows, 1974; 
Liu, 1996; Seltzer et al., 2002) that assigns weight parameters to each observation in the 
sample, as in a Weighted Least Squares analysis:  
 
                                     
,
, ,
,
   
i t
i t i t
i t
Y
w
εµ= +                                                            (5), 
 
where 
'
, , ,
,
I A
i t i t i tµ µ µ =   , ( )', , ,, N 0, I Ai t i t i tε ε ε = Σ  ∼ , ,i tw  is a positive random variable 
with density ( ),i tp w υ , and υ  a scalar or vector-valued parameter. The main advantage 
of assuming a normal/independent distribution is that, due to the unconstrained 
properties of Σ , the model now allows for any pattern of dependency between 
,
I
i tP  and 
                                               
1
 Due to the logarithmic transformations involved, the baseline composites are assumed to be 
strictly positive. Although this poses no problem for this type of electoral data, alternative 
models based on Box-Cox transformations (Rayens and Srinivasan, 1991) have been proposed to 
deal with the problem of null composites. 
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,
A
i tP .
2
  In addition, besides including the bivariate normal as a particular case (when 
,
1 ,i tw i t= ∀  ), the normal/independent distribution also provides a group of thick-tailed 
distributions often useful for robust inference and identification of outliers (Seltzer et al., 
2002; Rosa, Padovani and Gianola, 2003), particularly when the number of districts or 
elections in the sample is relatively small.  
 
The focus of the model lies in the specification of 
,i tµ . Since ,Ii tµ  and ,Ai tµ   are 
unbounded, it is possible to reparametrize them as linear functions of regressors. As 
mentioned in the introduction, it seems plausible that the proportion of invalid votes and 
electoral absenteeism in a district is influenced not only by district-level variables but 
also by national conditions that vary across elections. Moreover, the impact of district-
level variables on invalid voting and absenteeism might itself be mediated by these 
country-level factors. In order to account for these possibilities, I use a hierarchical 
random-coefficients model for the components of 
,i tµ . The first-level equations model 
,
I
i tµ  and ,Ai tµ  as functions of district-level variables measured at a particular election. The 
second-level equations specify the first-level coefficients as functions of country-level 
variables measured contemporaneously with the district level variables, plus zero-
expectation random effects assumed to be constant across all districts in a given election, 
accounting for election-to-election variability beyond that explained by national-level 
variables. In addition, I also introduce zero-mean random intercepts in order to account 
for time-constant heterogeneity across districts. This modeling strategy strikes a balance 
between a completely pooled approach, which ignores the clustered nature of the data 
and the potential variability between districts and elections, and local regressions that 
would be highly unstable given the paucity of the data typically available for analyzing 
countries with compulsory voting, most of them recently democratized Latin American 
nations (Browne and Draper, 2001; Gelman and Hill, 2007;). 
 
                                               
2
 This is, in fact, the key advantage of assuming a scale mixture of multivariate normals vis a vis 
alternative statistical models for compositional data, such as the Dirichlet distribution (Johnson 
and Kotz, 1972) and the S- distribution (Barndorff-Nielsen and Jørgensen, 1991). 
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Letting 
,i tx  and tz  represent ( )1 K×  and ( )1 L×  row vectors of district-level and 
country-level variables, respectively, the specification adopted is then:  
 
                                             
, ,
+    i t i t t iXµ β λ=                                                        (6)    
        t t tZβ δ η= +                                                               (7)  
where  
,i tX  is a ( )2 2 1K× + matrix, , 2 , 2i t i tX I x I = ⊗  , 
tβ   is a ( )2 1 1K + ×  vector, '0, 0, 1, 1, , ,...I A I A I At t t t t K t K tβ β β β β β β =   , 
tZ  is a ( ) ( )( )2 1 2 1 1K L K+ × + +  block diagonal matrix: ( )2 1 1t tKZ I z+  = ⊗  ,  
δ  is a ( )( )2 1 1 1K L+ + ×  vector, 0,0 0, 0,1 0, 1,0 ,I I A A I AL L K Lδ δ δ δ δ δ δ =  … … … ,  
( )'0, 0, 1, 1, , ,, , , ,... , 0,I A I A I At t t t t K t K t N ηη η η η η η η = Ω  ∼  and ( )', 0,I Ai i i N λλ λ λ = Ω  ∼  are  
election- and district- random effects.3 
From (5) - (7), the model can be written as: 
                                         
,
, , ,
,
i t
i t i t t i t t i
i t
Y X Z X
w
εδ η λ= + + +                                         (8) 
with error terms 
,i tε  and random effects tη  and iλ  assumed mutually independent. 
 
In order to estimate the model, I employ a fully Bayesian strategy, treating all 
unknown quantities as random and specifying prior distributions for all the parameters. 
The Bayesian approach straightforwardly accommodates problems with small samples 
typically available for countries with mandatory voting, since it does not rely on 
asymptotic results for inference (Thum, 2003; Jackman, 2004). In particular, unlike 
alternative estimation techniques (e.g., Full or Restricted Maximum Likelihood), 
inference about the fixed effects does not depend on the accuracy of the point estimates 
of the variance-covariance parameters: they are based on their posterior distribution 
given only the data, averaging over the uncertainty for all the parameters in the model 
(Goldstein, 1995; Bryk and Raudenbush, 2002). Taking into account the uncertainty in 
the estimation of the random parameters is especially important in small datasets, where 
                                               
3
 Throughout this paper, ⊗  denotes the left Kronecker product. 
 10 
the variance parameters are usually imprecisely estimated (Bryk and Raudenbush, 
2002).4,5   
 
Assuming conditional independence throughout, the model can be specified in a 
Bayesian context as  
                                
, ,
,
1
, , 1,..., , 1,...,i t i t t i
i t
Y N X i n t T
w
β λ + Σ = =  
 
∼                                      (9) 
                                              ( ), ,  1,...,t tN Z t Tηβ δ Ω =∼                                             (10) 
                                             ( )0, ,  1,...,i N i nλλ Ω =∼                                                   (11) 
with conjugate priors for the fixed effects and the precision matrices: 
                                       
( )
( )
0
1
1
1
~ , ,           
~ ( , ),   0, 2
~ ( , ),  0, 2 1
~ ( , ),  0, 2   
P P
Q Q
R R
N
Wishart P P
Wishart Q Q K
Wishart R R
δ
η
λ
δ δ
ρ ρ
ρ ρ
ρ ρ
−
−
−
Ω
Σ > ≥
Ω > ≥ +
Ω > ≥
                         (12) 
and ( ),i tp w υ  depending on the particular normal/independent distribution adopted for 
the level-1 errors. Routine sensitivity analyses can be performed in order to examine the 
effect of the hyperparameters on the model fit.          
    
From (9) – (12), and assuming that all the 
,
,  1,..., ,  1,..., ,i tw i n t T= =  are mutually 
independent, the joint posterior density of all the unknown parameters of the model is 
given by 
  
                                               
4
 In the context of frequentist estimation techniques, this uncertainty can be taken into account 
through bootstrapping (Goldstein, 1995) or simulation (King, Tomz and Wittenberg, 2000). 
However, the fact that the Bayesian approach directly takes into account the uncertainty in 
variance components makes it particularly appropriate for this kind of analysis.  
5
 In addition, as shown by Browne and Draper (2001), Maximum Likelihood methods are 
susceptible to convergence problems in two-level random-coefficients regression models with 
few higher-level units.  
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( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
/2 1
, , , , , ,
1 11 1
/2 /21 1
,
11 1
1
, , , , , , ,  exp - '
2
1 1
 exp - '   exp - '
2 2
n T n T
nT
i t i t i t i t t i i t i t t i
i ti t
n T T nT n
i t t t t t i i
t t ii t
f w Y w w Y X Y X
p w p Z Z
η λ
η η λ λ
β λ δ υ β λ β λ
υ υ β δ β δ λ λ
−
−
= == =
−
−
− −
= == =
   Σ Ω Ω ∝ Σ − − Σ − −  
  
   
× × ×Ω − Ω − × Ω Ω  
  
∑∑∏∏
∑ ∑∏∏
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
2 11
1 1 1 122
0 0
2 1 1 2 1
1 1 1 1 1 12 2
1 1
 exp - '   exp -
2 2
1 1
 exp -   exp -
2 2
P
Q RK
tr P
tr Q tr R
ρ
δ δ
ρ ρ
η η λ λ
δ δ δ δ
− −
−
− − − −
− + −
− −
− − − − − −


   
× Ω − Ω − × Σ Σ   
   
   
× Ω Ω × Ω Ω   
   
(13) 
 
Distribution (13) is intractable analytically, but inference on the parameters of interest 
can be performed by Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) simulations, using Gibbs 
sampling to repeatedly draw samples from each unknown parameter’s full conditional 
posterior distribution in order to form the marginal distributions used for Bayesian 
inference (Gelfland and Smith, 1990; Casella and George, 1992). In order to implement 
the Gibbs sampler, I subdivide the entire set of unknowns in (13) in such a way that it is 
possible to sample from the conditional posterior of each subset of unknowns given the 
other subsets and the data. This leads to an iterative scheme whereby, given an arbitrary 
set of starting values, samples are drawn from each full conditional posterior given the 
data and the most recently sampled values for the other unknowns (Gelfland, Hills, 
Racine-Poon, and Smith, 1990; Seltzer et al., 2002). Under mild regularity conditions 
(Geman and Geman, 1984), samples from these complete conditionals approach samples 
from the marginals for a sufficiently large number of iterations. The power and 
simplicity of the Gibbs sampler in handling complex hierarchical models involving 
covariates makes it an attractive option against alternative Bayesian/empirical Bayesian 
methodologies that must often rely on “…a number of approximations whose 
consequences are often unclear under the multiparameter likelihoods induced by the 
modeling “ (Gelfland et al., 1990, p. 978).   
 
Given ( )'
,1 ,,...,i n Tw w w=  the full conditional posterior densities of { } { }, , , ,t i ηβ λ δ Σ Ω  
and λΩ  are: 
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( )
( )
1
1 1 1 1
, , , , , ,
1 1
1
1 1
, , ,
1
, , , , , , , , ,   1, ... ,
' ' ,
'
t t t
n n
t i t i t i t i t i t i t i t
i i
n
t i t i t i t
i
Y w N b B t T
b w X X w X Y Z
B w X X
η λ
η η
η
β λ δ υ
λ δ
−
− − − −
= =
−
− −
=
Σ Ω Ω =
   
= Σ + Ω Σ − + Ω   
   
 
= Σ + Ω 
 
∑ ∑
∑
∼
                   (14) 
 
( )
( )
1
1 1 1
, , , ,
1 1
1
1 1
,
1
, , , , , , , , ,   1, ... ,
,
i i i
T T
i i t i t i t i t t
t t
T
i i t
t
Y w N d D i n
d w w Y X
D w
η λ
λ
λ
λ β δ υ
β
−
− − −
= =
−
− −
=
Σ Ω Ω =
   
= Σ + Ω Σ −   
   
 
= Σ + Ω 
 
∑ ∑
∑
∼
                                                 (15) 
 
1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1
0
1 1 1
, , , , , , , ' ' , '
T T T
t t t t t t
t t t
Y w N Z Z Z Z Zη λ η δ η δ η δδ β λ υ β δ
− −
− − − − − −
= = =
      Σ Ω Ω Ω +Ω Ω +Ω Ω +Ω             
∑ ∑ ∑∼     (16)               
 
( ) ( )
1
1 1
, , , , ,
1 1
, , , , , , , ' ,
T n
i t i t i t t i i t i t t i P
t i
Y w Wishart w Y X Y X P nTη λβ λ δ υ β λ β λ ρ
−
− −
= =
  Σ Ω Ω − − − − + +     
∑∑∼   (17) 
 
( )( )
1
1 1
1
, , , , , , , ' ,
T
t t t t Q
t
Y w Wishart Z Z Q Tη λβ λ δ υ β δ β δ ρ
−
− −
=
  Ω Σ Ω − − + +     
∑∼                   (18) 
 
1
1 1
1
, , , , , , , ' ,
n
i i R
i
Y w Wishart R nλ ηβ λ δ υ λλ ρ
−
− −
=
  Ω Σ Ω + +     
∑∼                                                    (19). 
 
To complete the specification for a Gibbs sampling scheme, the full conditional 
posterior distributions of w  and υ  are required. For each element of w   the fully 
conditional posterior density is:  
( ) ( ) ( ), 1, , , , , , ,, , , , , , , exp ' 2i ti t i t i t i t t i i t i t t i i tw Y w Y X Y X p wη λ
ωβ λ δ υ β λ β λ υ− Σ Ω Ω ∝ − − − Σ − − × 
 
      (20).  
For υ , the density is:  
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( ) ( ),
1 1
, , , , , , , ,
n T
i t
i t
Y w p p wη λυ β δ γ τ υ υ
= =
Σ Ω Ω ∝ ∏∏                                                               (21). 
 
From (14) – (21), it is clear that, assuming Normal level-1 residuals (i.e., if all the 
,
, 1,..., , 1,...,i tw i n t T= = , have degenerate distributions at 1), the conjugacy of the prior 
distributions at each stage of the hierarchy leads to closed-form full conditional 
distributions for each parameter of the model, and it is thus straightforward to sample 
from them in order to obtain the marginal distributions. However, the assumption of 
Normal level-1 residuals makes inferences vulnerable to the presence of outliers 
(Andrews and Mallows, 1974; Pinheiro, Liu and Wu, 2001). Assuming a bivariate 
Student-t prior for 
,i tY  allows for the possibility of extreme observations, attenuating the 
influence of outliers (Berger, 1985; Gelman, Carlin, Stern and Rubin, 2004) and 
providing a valuable tool with which to assess the sensitivity of inferences to prior 
distributional assumptions (Carlin and Louis, 1996; Thum, 1997).   
 
A bivariate Student t prior for 
,i tY  can be obtained from the normal/independent 
distribution by assuming ( )
,
/2, /2i tw Gammaυ υ υ∼ , , 0, 0i tw υ> > .
6
 The fully conditional 
posterior densities (20) and (21) then become: 
 
( ) ( )1, , , , ,1, , , , , , , 1, '  2 2i t i t i t t i i t i t t iw Y Gamma Y X Y Xη λ
υβ λ δ υ β λ β λ υ−  Σ Ω Ω + − − Σ − − +   ∼          (20’) 
( )/2 2 , ,
1 1
, , , , , , , 2 exp log
2 2
nT nT n T
i t i t
i t
Y w w w
υ
υ
η λ
υ υ
υ β λ δ υ
−
= =
     Σ Ω Ω Γ − −     
      
∑∑∼                      (21’). 
 
While it might be argued that working directly with a bivariate Student t density for 
, ,
, '
I A
i t i tε ε    would be preferable to adding nT parameters to the model, the conditioning 
feature of the Gibbs sampler makes the augmentation of the parameter space quite 
natural (Carlin and Louis, 1996). In addition, this specification allows obtaining 
estimates of the weight parameters
,i tw , which can be useful to identify possible outliers 
                                               
6
 I use the parametrization of the gamma distribution found in Rosa et al., 2003.  
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that might be masked in standard residual plots (Box, 1979; Seltzer et al., 2002; 
Congdon, 2003). Note that, from (20’),  
 
( ) ( ) ( ), 1, , , ,
2
, , , , , , ,
'  
i t
i t i t t i i t i t t i
E w Y
Y X Y Xη λ
υβ λ γ υ β λ β λ υ−
+Σ Ω Ω =
− − Σ − − +
          (22),   
 
so that for a large enough υ , ( ), , , , , , , , 1i tE w Y η λβ λ γ υΣ Ω Ω → , and approximately 
normal tails are obtained for the level-1 errors. However, for low values of υ , the 
expected value of 
,i tw  decreases as ( ) ( )1, , , ,'  i t i t t i i t i t t iY X Y Xβ λ β λ−− − Σ − −  increases. 
Therefore, the weight assigned to each observation in calculating posterior distributions 
of fixed-effects and level-1 regression parameters will depend on the posterior 
probabilities of the possible values of υ .7 Although (21’) does not have a closed form, 
this conditional posterior distribution can be approximated by discretizing the density 
along a grid of values and then sampling from the resulting discrete distributions. When 
the points in the grid are spaced closely together, the discrete distribution of υ  provides 
an accurate approximation to the full conditional distribution (Draper, 2001; Seltzer et 
al., 2002).8  
 
The two variants of the model (with bivariate normal or bivariate Student-t level-1 
errors) can be compared using standard Bayesian criteria for model selection such as the 
Deviance Information Criterion (DIC) or Bayes factors (Spiegelhalter, Best, Carlin and 
van der Linde, 2002; Gelman et al., 2004).  The means and standard deviation of the 
convergent Gibbs samples generated from (14)-(21) under each variant of the model can 
be used to summarize the posterior distributions of the parameters. These marginal 
posterior distributions, however, are of no direct interest for the analysis. Rather, interest 
lies in the effect of the explanatory variables on the proportion of invalid voting and 
electoral absenteeism. I compute the impact of each of the district-level and country-
level regressors on 
,
I
i tP  and ,
A
i tP  using average predictive comparisons (Katz and King, 
                                               
7
 A detailed discussion of this point is provided in Seltzer et al., 2002. 
8
 Alternatively, a strategy based on Metropolis-Hastings sampling can be incorporated into the 
MCMC scheme to obtain draws from υ  (Seltzer et al., 2002; Gelman et al., 2004). 
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1999; King, Tomz and Wittenberg, 2000; Gelman and Hill, 2007). The algorithm 
implemented to estimate these causal effects is detailed in Appendix I.  
 
Some aspects of the model deserve further comment. First, while in the presentation 
above it has been assumed that 
 , 1,...iT T i i n= ∀ =  in order to simplify the notation, the 
model can accommodate unbalanced data sets, with different number of elections per 
district. In fact, the capacity and flexibility to deal with nested unbalanced data sets is 
one additional advantage of Bayesian multilevel models versus more traditional 
frequentist approaches (Bryk and Raudenbush, 2002; Shor et al., 2007). Also, a more 
complex specification for the components of Σ  could be adopted (e.g., allowing for 
serial correlation of the level-1 errors - Allenby and Lenk, 1994). Nonetheless, given the 
relatively small number of observations available in the application of Section 4 (with 
very few elections per state in some cases) and the inclusion of district random-effects, 
an i.i.d. assumption for the components of Σ  seems appropriate (Carlin and Louis, 1996; 
Bryk and Raudenbush, 2002). Finally, as mentioned above, although I focus on two 
particular variants of the mixed model – i.e., with Normal and Student-t level-1 errors – 
assuming alternative densities for 
,i tw  would allow obtaining other thick-tailed 
distributions – e.g., slash and contaminated Normals, as in Rosa et al. (2003) - that might 
be appropriate to account for the presence of outliers.  
 
4. Analyzing invalid voting and electoral absenteeism in Brazil’s 
lower house elections 
 
 4.1.  Data and methodology 
Brazil provides an interesting case to analyze the determinants of abstention in 
countries with mandatory voting. While invalid ballots in advanced democracies under 
compulsory voting such as Australia and the Netherlands have averaged about 2 to 3 
percent, the equivalent rates in Brazil have been substantially higher and more volatile 
over time, reaching almost 42 percent of the votes cast in the 1994 lower house election 
(Power and Roberts, 1995; IUPERJ, 2006). In addition, despite the fact that voting has 
been compulsory in the country for over 60 years, electoral absenteeism has averaged 19 
percent in elections held over this period, varying from 5 to 34.5 percent (IUPERJ, 
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2006).  Changes in the institutional design and the freeness and fairness of the elections 
experienced by Brazil in its recent history and the sharp differences in socio-
demographic characteristics among its states allow examining the impact of different 
factors on invalid voting and absenteeism.9 In order to illustrate the use of the model 
presented in Section 3 and to compare the results with those obtained using alternative 
modeling strategies, I analyze all lower house elections held in the country between 1945 
and 2006. The dataset has an unbalance structure, with 388 observations for 27 states 
across 16 elections.10  
 
The dependent variables of interest for the analysis are the proportion of invalid votes 
and electoral absenteeism in lower house elections. The proportion of invalid votes 
among the electorate is computed as the ratio of blank and null votes cast over the 
population eligible to vote. Electoral absenteeism is calculated as the percentage of 
potential voters failing to comply with their duty. Figure 2 presents the proportion of 
invalid voting and absenteeism by state for the elections held between 1945 and 2006. As 
can be seen, there is considerable variation in the two sources of abstention both between 
states and within states across elections.11  
 
[Figure 2] 
 
In line with the different theories under consideration, socioeconomic, institutional 
and protest variables are included as explanatory variables in the model. The 
socioeconomic variables used are: Illiteracy, the percentage of the state’s voting-age 
population classified as illiterate; Urbanization, the percentage of the state’s population 
living in urban areas; and FEAP, the percentage of females in the Economically Active 
Population, used as a measure of women’s status and the state’s level of modernization. 
The institutional variables are: the number of Candidates per seat;  Franchising, a 
dichotomous variable coded 1 for elections after 1985, when suffrage was extended to 
the illiterates, and 0 otherwise; Electorate, measured as the percentage of the state’s total 
population eligible to vote; and Ballot, a dummy variable coded one for elections 
                                               
9
 A description of the institutional, socioeconomic and political context of Brazilian elections 
exceeds the purposes of this paper; an overview can be found in Power and Roberts (1995).  
10
 The number of states in Brazil increased from twenty-two to twenty-seven during this period. 
11
 The proportions are calculated based on the number of elections held in each state. 
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following the introduction of the single official ballot in 1962, that requires voters to 
write their candidate’s name or registration number on a blank ballot and replaced the 
previous system of pre-printed ballots.12 Finally, among the protest variables, Electoral 
Manipulation measures the degree of electoral and political “engineering”, coded by 
Power and Roberts (1995) on a four point-scale ranging from 0 for free elections held 
under democratic rule to 3 for elections conducted under authoritarian tutelage; Growth 
is a two-year moving average of the percentage change in the national GDP; and 
Inflation is the natural logarithm of the country’s average inflation rate in the two years 
preceding the election. Table 1 provides summary statistics for the state-level and 
country-level predictors for the period 1945-2006. 
 
[Table 1 here] 
 
The characterization and measurement of the independent variables closely follows 
Power and Roberts (1995); their data is complemented with information from IUPERJ 
(2006) for the 1994-2006 elections. The only difference with the authors lies in the 
definition of Illiteracy: while they use the percentage of the state’s electorate classified 
as illiterate (zero until 1985, when illiterates were enfranchised), I use the percentage of 
illiterates in the state’s voting-age population. Although illiterates were not allowed to 
vote in Brazil until the 1986 election, the fact that more than sixty percent of the 
population had not finished the fourth grade by 1986 (Brazilian Institute of Geography 
and Statistics, 2003) and the difficulty of obtaining alternative reliable indicators 
covering the period under study led me to use illiteracy as a measure of the electorate’s 
political skills (Power and Garand, 2007). In order to account for the effect of the 
enfranchisement of illiterates, I include the country-level variable Franchising and model 
the random-coefficients of Illiteracy as functions of it, allowing the effect of Illiteracy to 
vary across elections.  
 
In addition, in line with Power and Roberts’ (1995) argument that the country-level 
predictors Ballot, Electoral Manipulation, Growth and Inflation affect the proportion of 
                                               
12
 Prior to the introduction of the single official ballot (“cedula unica”) in 1962, candidates 
distributed their own pre-printed ballots, which voters just had to place in the ballot box. While 
this required considerably less information on the part of voters, it tended to favor wealthier 
candidates to the detriment of less affluent ones (Power and Roberts, 1995). 
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invalid voting and absenteeism in each state-year, I specify the election random-
intercepts 
'
0, 0, 0,,  
I A
t t tβ β β =   as functions of these variables. Given the small number of 
observations in the sample (Table 1), the coefficients of the remaining district-level 
variables are specified as fixed effects (i.e., their variation across elections is constrained 
to be 0), although the model could be written more generally to accommodate various 
plausible design alternatives for parametrizing these coefficients. 
 
The following equations define the hierarchical model for district ,  1,...,  i i n= at 
election ,  1,...,  t t T= :   
 
, 0, 1, , 2, , 3, ,
,
4, , 5, ,
,
         + ,                         ,
s s s s s
i t t t i t t i t t i t
s
i ts s s
t i t t i t i
i t
Y Illiteracy Urbanization FEAP
Candidates per Seat Electorate s I A
w
β β β β
εβ β λ
= + + + +
+ + =
  (23) 
0, 0,0 0,1 0,2 0,3 0,4 0,. ,  ,
s s s s s s s
t t t t t tBallot E Manipulation Growth Inflation s I Aβ δ δ δ δ δ η= + + + + + =     (24) 
1, 1,0 1,1 1, ,
s s s s
t t tFranchising ,                                                                         s I Aβ δ δ η= + + =    (25) 
, ,0                                                                                         , ; 2,...,5s sk t k s I A kβ δ= = =    (26)  
with  ( )'
, ,
, 0,I Ai t i t Nε ε  Σ  ∼ , ( )'0, 0, 1, 1,, , , 0,I A I At t t t t N ηη η η η η = Ω  ∼ ,  ( ), 0, ,I Ai i N λλ λ  Ω  ∼  
and   
( )
( )
( )
,
,
,
1 ,  bivariate normal prior for  or 
,  ,  bivariate Student t prior for 
2 2
i t
i t
i t
i t Y
p w
Gamma i t Y
υ υ υ
 ∀

=    ∀  
 
.  
 
The model was fit using WinBUGS 1.4, as called from R 2.4.1. 13   All the 
hyperparameters in the model were assigned diffuse priors in order to let the data 
dominate the form of the posterior densities: the fixed effects were assigned a ( ),N I0 100  
prior, while Wishart priors with identity scale matrix and degrees of freedom equal to  
( ) 1rank I +  were used for the precision matrices (Congdon, 2003). In order to ensure that 
inferences are data dependent, several alternative values for the hyperparameters were 
tried, yielding similar substantive results. Three parallel chains with dispersed initial 
                                               
13
 The code is available from the author on request. 
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values reached approximate convergence after 25,000 iterations, with a burn-in of 5,000 
iterations; the results reported below are based on 1,000 samples of the pooled chains of 
deviates.14 
  
 4.2. Results of the compositional-hierarchical model  
Table 2 below reports the posterior means and 90% confidence intervals for the fixed 
effects for the two variants of the model presented in Section 3: assuming bivariate 
Normal (Model 1-a) and bivariate Student-t (Model 1-b)  level-1 priors.15 The values of 
the Deviance Information Criterion (DIC) for both models and the Bayes Factor for 
Model 1-b relative to Model 1-a are also presented.  
 
[Table 2 here] 
 
Table 2 shows considerable disparity in the posterior means and confidence intervals 
of the fixed effects under both models, particularly regarding the effect of state-level 
predictors on the log-ratios IY and AY .16 Comparisons between the two models based on 
both the DIC and Bayes Factor favor Model 1-b, indicating that the model with Student-t 
level-1 errors fits the data better. The evidence presented in Figures 3 and 4 further 
support Model 1-b. Figure 3 plots the mean posterior values of the standardized 
univariate and bivariate level-1 residuals from Model 1-a for the 388 observations in the 
dataset (Chaloner and Brant, 1988; Weiss, 1994). A few data points have standardized 
univariate residuals with absolute values larger than 5, and more than 2% of the 
observations are clear bivariate outliers, suggesting that a thick-tailed distribution might 
be better suited to the data.  
 
[Figure 3 here] 
 
                                               
14
 Approximate convergence is achieved for values of Gelman and Rubin’s (1992) estimated 
Potential Scale Reduction factor below 1.1.  
15
 In addition, I also estimated the model under the assumption of multivariate Student-t priors for 
the random coefficients.  The main results, however, are virtually unchanged when assuming 
heavy tails at the higher-level of the model. Thus, I retain the assumption of multivariate 
normality at level-2 and focus on the effect of adopting alternative priors for the data model.   
16
 It is worth noting that, when treating υ  as unknown, the uncertainty regarding υ  is propagated 
into the posterior distribution of the fixed-effects parameters (Seltzer et al., 2002).  
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In the same direction, the mean posterior estimate of υ  under Model 1-b is 3.3, with 
its marginal posterior density concentrated around small values (Figure 4-a), indicating 
very strong departure from Normality and pointing to a heavy-tailed error distribution. 
As noted in Section 3, small values of υ  determine that observations are weighted by an 
inverse function of the Mahalanobis distance ( ) ( )1
, , , ,
'  i t i t t i i t i t t iY X Y Xβ λ β λ−− − Σ − −  
adjusted by the degrees of freedom. Hence, for those observations identified as 
(bivariate) outliers in the model with Normal level-1 errors, the posterior probability that 
,i tw   is equal or greater than 1 is negligible, as illustrated in Figure 4-b. Overall, the 
posterior probability that ( )
,
1i tP w ≥  is less than 1% for roughly 6% of the observations 
in the sample, providing strong evidence of outliers (Congdon, 2003; Rosa et al, 2003). 
In addition, given that the “weight parameters” also reduce the influence of extreme 
observations on the posterior distribution of the random parameters– equations (14) and 
(15) - , the number of (multivariate) level-2 election outliers (Weiss, 1994) in Model 1-b 
is also halved with respect to Model 1-a (Figure 5). 
 
[Figure 4 here] 
 
[Figure 5 here] 
 
Since the different comparison criteria examined above favor the model with Student-
t errors, I focus on the results from Model 1-b in the remainder of the paper. Table 3 
reports the posterior distribution of the covariance components from the chosen model. 
The mean posterior correlation between the level-1 errors is moderately positive (0.24) 
and statistically significant at the 0.01 level, contradicting the assumption of no 
correlation underlying separate univariate analyses of invalid voting and absenteeism. 
Hence, states that experience higher relative proportions of invalid voting in an election 
than predicted by the model also exhibit higher relative proportions of electoral 
absenteeism. In addition, the bottom panel of Table 3 reveals that there is considerable 
variation in the election effects beyond that explained by the national-level variables 
included in the model. While the average correlation in IY  and AY  within states across 
elections are 0.28 and 0.24, respectively, the corresponding intra-election correlations 
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between states are as large as 0.57 and 0.75, suggesting that election-specific 
circumstances have a substantial influence on both forms of abstention. 
 
[Table 3 here] 
 
 Based on the convergent Gibbs samples of the parameters of Model 1-b, I estimate 
the average effect of a one-unit change in each of the state-level and national-level 
predictors on the proportion of invalid ballots and electoral absenteeism.17 The results, 
reported in Table 4, reveal some interesting discrepancies regarding the determinants of 
the two sources of abstention. While only Illiteracy had a positive and significant effect 
on electoral absenteeism at the usual confidence levels, invalid voting in Brazil’s lower 
house elections was strongly and positively related both to the average levels of 
education and skills among the electorate and to political protest. The proportion of 
blank and spoiled ballots rose by 0.09 percentage points for each percentage-point 
increase in the share of illiterates in the voting-age population, and it further rose by 
more than 6 points on average with the extension of suffrage to illiterates in 1985. The 
addition of new voters was also positively related to invalid ballots: each percent 
increase in the fraction of the states’ population eligible to vote was associated to a 0.13 
percentage-point rise in blank and null votes. Among the protest variables, higher levels 
of authoritarian political engineering resulted in an average increase of 3.4 percentage 
points in invalid voting. Although electoral manipulation also boosted illegal abstention, 
the impact of this variable on absenteeism was much more variable across states and 
elections. The positive and significant effect of Inflation on invalid voting suggests that 
blank and null ballots might reflect not only popular dissatisfaction with inadequate 
representative institutions (Schwartzman, 1973), but also discontent with poor 
macroeconomic performance and economic mismanagement by the political elites.18 
While these results provide evidence in support of the “protest hypothesis” of invalid 
voting, they also suggest that less educated and newly enfranchised voters in Brazil face 
considerable barriers to voting (Power and Roberts, 1995).  The evidence is far less 
                                               
17
 In the case of the two binary variables, Ballot and Franchising, the effect is measured as a 
change from 0 to 1. 
18
 High and persistent inflation rates have characterized the Brazilian economy throughout the 
20th century, and price stabilization has been the major macroeconomic concern for Brazilian 
policy-makers, although usually with disastrous results (Langoni, 1997). 
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conclusive in the case of electoral absenteeism, underscoring the need to examine 
additional factors that might affect noncompliance with compulsory voting laws and to 
distinguish between the determinants of both sources of abstention from a theoretical 
perspective. 
 
Remarkably, while all the socio-economic variables tend to affect both sources of 
abstention in the same direction, many of the institutional and protest variables exhibit 
opposite average effects on the two forms of non-voting. In particular, two relevant 
institutional features of the open-list PR system used in Brazil’s lower house election, 
namely, a large number of candidates running for office and the introduction of the 
single official ballot, have a positive impact on increase invalid voting but a negative 
average effect on illegal abstention. The opposite effect of Ballot and Candidates per 
seat on the two forms of non-voting suggests that there might be a certain trade-off 
between attracting voters to the polls and facilitating effective electoral participation. 
Factors that give voters more opportunities to influence electoral results ex-ante, such as 
the availability of more electoral options and a ballot design that gives voters more 
freedom to choose their preferred candidate, tend to increase turnout. However, at the 
moment of casting a vote, the proliferation of candidates and the requirement that voters 
record their preferred candidate’s name or registration number on the paper ballot tend to 
increase invalid voting, probably because they impose considerable informational 
requirements and heavy decision-making costs on the electorate, especially in the context 
of high illiteracy rates and massive expansion of the franchise experienced in Brazil 
throughout the 20th century.  
 
[Table 4 here] 
 
 
4.3 Comparison with alternative modeling approaches 
In order to illustrate the differences between the model presented here and alternative 
approaches used to analyze abstention in compulsory voting systems, Figure 6 below 
contrasts the average causal effects of the predictors on invalid voting and absenteeism 
under Model 1-b with those obtained under three models that fail to account for the 
compositional and/or the hierarchical structure of the data. Model 2 uses separate 
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ordinary least squares regressions for invalid voting and absenteeism, assuming 
independence among observations and simply pooling state-level and country-level 
predictors by assigning the values of the national variables to all the states in a given 
election. Model 3 uses separate hierarchical linear models for invalid voting and 
absenteeism, accounting for the temporal and geographical clustering of the data but 
ignoring the non-negativity and unit-sum constraints (1) and (2). Finally, Model 4 is a 
compositional model with random intercepts for each state but no election-random 
effects, again assuming a deterministic relationship between national- and state-level 
predictors. The specifications of Models 2, 3 and 4 are detailed in Appendix II. 19  
 
[Figure 6 here] 
 
The results reported in Figure 6 shows some noticeable differences between the four 
models. As seen in the upper and lower panels, the standard errors of the marginal effects 
of the covariates on both sources of abstention under Model 1-b tend to be considerably 
smaller than for Model 3 and much larger than for Models 2 and 4, particularly in the 
case of the country-level variables. This leads to different conclusions about the relative 
size and the statistical significance of the impact of the national-level predictors on 
invalid voting and electoral absenteeism under the different models. For instance, setting 
the stochastic terms in tη  to zero in Models 2 and 4 leads to significant effects of 
economic growth on both sources of abstention at the 0.01 level. In contrast, Growth has 
no systematic effect on either source of abstention under Models 1 and 3. At the other 
extreme, the large standard errors for the country-level comparisons under Model 3 
determine that none of national-level variables has a significant effect on either source of 
abstention at the usual confidence levels.  
 
More importantly, the four models lead to different substantive conclusions regarding 
the impact of some of the variables on the two sources of abstention. As seen in the 
                                               
19
 Models 3 and 4 were fitted by MCMC simulations (Gibbs Sampling), using a 
normal/independent distribution for the data model, Gaussian priors for the random coefficients 
and diffuse conjugate priors for the hyperparameters. The substantive results remain unchanged 
if Gaussian level-1 errors are assumed. Details of the estimation are available from the author 
upon request. 
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lower panel of Figure 5, the results from Models 2 and 4 show that that the extension of 
voting rights to illiterates led to significantly lower levels of electoral absenteeism, 
suggesting that this group of new voters was more likely to show up at the polls even 
when, unlike for literate citizens between 18 and 70 years of age, voting is optional for 
illiterates. While inferences drawn from these two models tend to support the claim that 
“the fact that voting is…optional for illiterates seems to have little practical effect on 
their observance of mandatory voting” (Power and Roberts, 1995, p. 800), the average 
effect of Franchising on electoral absenteeism has the opposite sign under Model 1-b. 
Also, while a higher number of Candidates per seat has a positive average effect on 
invalid voting under Model 1-b, suggesting that a larger number of contestants increases 
the likelihood of voter error and/or makes it more difficult for voters to choose a single 
preferred candidate, this relationship is negative under Models 3 and 4. Finally, under 
Model 2, Ballot has a negative and statistically significant effect on invalid voting, 
leading to the rather implausible conclusion that the introduction of a more complex 
ballot system that requires considerable more information on the part of voters resulted 
in lower rates of blank and spoiled ballots. These examples illustrate the fact that some 
of the inferences drawn from the model developed in this paper contradict the results 
both from the separate univariate analyses (Models 2 and 3) and from an analysis that 
ignores election-to-election variability in both sources of abstention  beyond that 
explained by national-level variables (Model 4). The conflicting results from the 
different models lead to different conclusions about the relative validity of the alternative 
theories proposed to account for abstention under mandatory voting and might entail 
very different implications regarding, for instance, the design of electoral systems and 
the institutional reforms needed to promote and consolidate political participation in 
compulsory voting systems (McAllister and Makkai, 1993; Power and Roberts, 1995). 
 
In order to compare the fit of the four models, I use posterior predictive simulations 
(Gelman et al., 2004, Gelman and Hill, 2007).  Following Iyengar and Dey (2004), a 
plausible comparison criteria based on the discrepancy between observed and simulated 
data would favor the model that minimizes the predictive loss 
( ) ( )2Rep Rep, Obs Obs Obsd P P E P P P= − , where ( ) ( )( )1, , ,,...,Rep Rep JRepi t i t i tP P P=  denotes the 
replicate data sampled from the predictive distribution 
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( ) ( ) ( ), , , ,| | |Rep Obs Rep Obsi t i t i t i tp P P p P p P dθ θ θ= ∫  under each model.20 The posterior predictive 
loss d  can then be estimated as: 
                                           
 ( )
2
Rep
, ,
1 1 1
1n T J jObs
i t i t
i t j
d P P
J
= = =
 
= −  
 
∑∑ ∑ .                                 (27) 
 
Table 5 reports the estimates and 90% confidence intervals for the posterior predictive 
loss based on 1,000J =  hypothetical replications of 
,
I
i tP  and ,
A
i tP  for the four models. The 
compositional-hierarchical model exhibits the lowest discrepancy between the replicated 
and the actual data (at the 0.01 level). In contrast, the two models that implement 
separate univariate analyses for each source of abstention have the highest estimated 
predicted losses. In particular, Model 2, which in addition ignores the multilevel nature 
of the data, exhibits the worst fit.   
 
[Table 5 here] 
 
The superior performance of Model 1-b is also illustrated in Figure 7, which plots the 
actual proportions of invalid voting and absenteeism and the expected proportions under 
the four models, obtained by averaging ( )Rep
,
,  1,...,1000,ji tP j =  over the simulations. As seen 
in the Figure, Models 2 and 3 lead to negative expected proportions of invalid votes for 
49% and 14% of the state-years in the sample, respectively. While both compositional 
models avoid this problem, relaxing the assumption of a deterministic relationship 
between national- and state-level predictors and allowing for additional variability in the 
election effects results in a better fit for Model 1-b vis a vis Model 4. Hence, the 
evidence presented above indicates that the statistical model developed in this paper 
provides a much improved fit over the other three modeling approaches considered, and 
reveals that the methodological differences between these competing empirical strategies 
have substantial consequences in terms of the analysis of the determinants of abstention 
under compulsory voting.  
[Figure 7 here] 
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 In the case of the compositional-hierarchical model, Rep
,i tP  are obtained from ,
Rep
i tY  using the 
logarithmic transformations (3) and (4). 
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5.  Concluding remarks 
Different theories, drawing on the literature on voter turnout in industrialized 
democracies, have been proposed in order to account for the phenomena of invalid 
voting and electoral absenteeism under mandatory voting. This paper integrates the 
socioeconomic, institutional, and political-protest approaches in a statistical model aimed 
at analyzing the determinants of both sources of abstention in district-level elections. The 
model presented in this paper accounts for the compositional and hierarchical structure 
of district-level electoral data and easily accommodates sensitivity analysis, 
encompassing a family of thick-tailed distributions that can be used for robust inference. 
 
 Results obtained from the application of the model to analyze abstention in Brazil’s 
legislative elections allow drawing interesting substantive and methodological 
conclusions. The evidence presented above reveals substantial differences in the 
determinants of both forms of non-voting. In line with Power and Roberts (1995), I find 
that the proportion of blank and null ballots in Brazil’s lower house elections was 
strongly positively related both to political protest and to the existence of important 
informational barriers to voting, in particular for less educated and newly enfranchised 
voters. The influence of these variables on illegal abstention, however, was less evident. 
In addition, some of the institutional characteristics of the electoral system, such as the 
proliferation of candidates and the introduction of a complex ballot design, seem to 
affect the two sources of abstention in opposite directions. Comparisons based on 
posterior simulations indicate that the model presented here fits the data considerably 
better than several alternative empirical strategies used to analyze abstention under 
compulsory voting. More importantly, the main conclusions and the policy implications 
resulting from the compositional-hierarchical model might differ significantly from those 
drawn using less appropriate modeling approaches prevailing in previous research in this 
area.  
 
Although the model was applied to the particular case of Brazil, it provides a general 
tool to analyze the determinants of abstention in compulsory systems. Also, the mixed 
model presented in Section 3 can be modified in order to accommodate other possible 
distributions of the error terms at each level of the hierarchy (Andrew and Mallows, 
1974; West, 1984; Seltzer et al., 2002; Rosa et al. 2003). An immediate extension of the 
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paper would be to include a larger number of countries and additional covariates in order 
to analyze the performance of the model and the robustness of the results from a 
comparative politics perspective. From a methodological standpoint, using non-
parametric methods to estimate the joint density of invalid voting and absenteeism would 
allow examining their determinants and interactions without imposing specific 
parametric distributions. 
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Tables and Figures     
Figure 1 
Proportion of invalid votes, electoral absenteeism and valid votes  
in Brazil’s lower house elections, 1945 – 2006 
 
 Note: Each circle in the figure indicates the values of IP , AP  and VP  in a   
particular district for a given election. IP  is measured on the scale in the 
triangle’s left side, AP  is measured on the right side, and VP is measured on the 
scale in the triangle’s base.  
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Figure 2  
Invalid voting and absenteeism by state and election, as a % of the electorate 
Lower house elections, 1945 - 2006  
 
Sources: Banco de Dados Eleitorais Do Brasil, Instituto Universitario de Pesquisas de Rio de 
Janeiro (IUPERJ); Power and Roberts (1995).  
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Table 1  
 Summary statistics – Independent variables  
Variable Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Min 
25th 
percentile 
75th 
percentile 
Max 
State-level predictors       
Illiteracy (%) 40.0 20.8 4.7 24.6 58.9 79.8 
Urbanization (%) 55.4 21.0 2.6 38.1 72.1 96.6 
Females in the EAP (FEAP) (%) 23.3 16.4 3.0 10.3 40.8 58.1 
Candidates per seat 4.4 2.8 1.0 2.3 6.0 15.4 
Electorate (%) 40.4 19.2 6.9 24.3 59.0 74.4 
Country-level predictors       
Franchising 0.4 0.5 0 0 1 1 
Ballot 0.8 0.4 0 0.8 1 1 
Electoral Manipulation 0.9 1.1 0 0 1.3 3 
Growth (%) 5.3 3.6 -1.7 3.7 7.6 11.1 
Inflation  3.7 1.7 1.7 2.7 4.2 7.5 
Number of States 27 
Number of Elections 16 
Observations 388 
Sources: Banco de Dados Eleitorais Do Brasil, Instituto Universitario de Pesquisas de Rio de 
Janeiro (IUPERJ); Power and Roberts (1995).  
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Table 2 
Estimated posterior means and 90% confidence intervals for fixed effects  
under alternative distributional assumptions for the error terms   
Model 1-a 
Gaussian  level-1 errors  
Model 1-b 
Student-t level-1 errors  Parameters 
IY  AY  IY  AY  
Illiteracy 
-0.03 
(-0.94, 0.90) 
0.76 
(0.19, 1.35) 
0.24 
(-0.52, 1.01) 
0.74 
(0.18, 1.24) 
Urbanization 
-0.88 
(-1.65, -0.13) 
-0.14 
(-0.58, 0.34) 
-0.15 
(-0.79, 0.49) 
-0.17 
(-0.62, 0.27) 
FEAP 
2.30 
(0.64, 3.98) 
-0.18 
(-1.27, 0.87) 
1.00 
(-0.24, 2.24) 
0.48 
(-0.42, 1.40) 
Candidates per seat 
0.03 
(0.01, 0.06) 
0.01 
(-0.01, 0.02) 
0.02 
(-0.01, 0.04) 
0.01 
(-0.01, 0.02) 
Electorate 
1.50 
(0.62, 2.55) 
 0.74 
(0.17, 1.30) 
1.30 
(0.42, 2.17) 
0.47 
(-0.15, 1.10) 
Franchising 
1.50 
(0.70, 2.30) 
0.66 
(0.07, 1.27) 
1.50 
(0.75, 2.32) 
0.49 
(-0.04, 1.02) 
Ballot 
-0.04 
(-0.82, 0.68) 
-0.19 
(-0.97, 0.60) 
0.22 
(-0.45, 0.93) 
-0.27 
(-0.98, 0.50) 
Electoral 
Manipulation 
0.52 
(0.24, 0.85) 
0.33 
(0.03, 0.64) 
0.41 
(0.15, 0.67) 
0.36 
(0.07, 0.66) 
Growth 
4.30 
(-2.40, 11.20) 
-5.40 
(-14.1, 2.90) 
5.00 
(-1.70, 11.60) 
-5.50 
(-13.70, 2.90) 
Inflation 
0.38 
(0.23, 0.52) 
-0.01 
(-0.17, 0.17) 
0.34 
(0.20, 0.48) 
-0.01 
(-0.16, 0.18) 
Intercept 
-5.40 
(-6.50, -4.30) 
-1.90 
(-3.02, -0.86) 
-5.30 
(-6.40, -4.20) 
-2.0 
(-3.10, -0.90) 
 N (first level) 388 388 
DIC1 557.90 242.30 
Bayes factor2 - 9.79 ×106 
1
 The Deviance Information Criterion (DIC) is computed as:   
( )( ) ( )
1
12 2log 2log
J
j
j
p y p y
J
θ θ
=
 
− + 
 
∑ , 
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with ( )E yθ θ= , the posterior mean of the model’s parameters. Lower values of the DIC 
indicate better fit to the data. 
2 The Bayes factor for model jM  relative to model kM  is given by  
    
( )
( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( ),
,  
,  
j j j j jj
j k
k k k k k k
p y M p M dp y M
B
p y M p y M p M d
θ θ θ
θ θ θ
= =
∫
∫
.                          
I use the harmonic mean of the likelihood evaluated at the posterior draws of the parameters  
(Newton and Raftery, 1994; Rosa et al., 2003) as an estimate for ( ) ,   ,xp y M x j k= : 
 ( ) ( )( ) 111
1
| |
R
r
x x
r
p y M R p y θ
−
−
−
=
 
=  
 
∑  
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Figure 3 
Posterior means of the level-1 residuals from Model 1-a 
 
 
Note: The standardized univariate and bivariate level-1 residuals in Figure 3-a are computed 
based on the Bayesian outlier statistics proposed by Weiss (1994): 
( ) ( )
( )
, ,
1
1
, ,
s j s jsJ i t i t t i
s j
j
Y X
 s I A
J
β λ
σ=
− −
=∑  and ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )' 1, , , ,
1
1 J j j j j j
i t i t t i i t i t t i
j
Y X Y X
J
β λ β λ−
=
− − Σ − −∑ . 
For the univariate residuals, the dashed horizontal lines correspond to the threshold of 3. For the 
bivariate residuals, the cutoff point is determined as ( ) ( )22 1 , 3 .k  =2αχ α−= × Φ −   
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Figure 4 
 Marginal posterior densities of υ  and 
,i tw  under Model 1-b 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 35 
 
Figure 5 
 
 
Note: Figure 5-a plots the posterior means of the standardized election residuals, computed as 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )' 1
1
1 J j j j j j
t t t t
j
Z Z
J η
β δ β δ−
=
− Ω −∑  (Weiss, 1994). The dashed horizontal lines correspond 
to the cutoff point ( ) ( )24 1 , 3 .k  =2αχ α−= × Φ −  Figure 5-b plots the marginal posterior means of 
the weight parameters 
,i tw , by election. 
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Table 3 
Posterior means of variance-covariance components under Model 1-b 
   
 Level 1-errors  
  Invalid Voting Absenteeism  
 
Invalid Voting 
0.17 
(0.03, 0.54)  
 
 
Absenteeism 
0.03 
(0.01, 0.09) 
0.08 
(0.01, 0.26) 
 
     
 Level 2: State random effects  
  Invalid Voting Absenteeism  
 
Invalid Voting 
0.16 
(0.09, 0.26)  
 
 
Absenteeism 
0.01 
(-0.04, 0.05) 
0.11 
(0.07, 0.16) 
 
     
Level 2: Election random effects 
 Invalid voting 
Intercept 
Invalid voting  
Illiteracy 
Absenteeism  
Intercept 
Absenteeism  
Illiteracy 
Invalid voting 
Intercept 
0.27 
(0.12, 0.51)    
Invalid voting  
Illiteracy 
-0.06 
(-0.32, 0.14) 
0.62 
(0.24, 1.27)   
Absenteeism  
Intercept 
0.05 
(-0.14, 0.27) 
-0.07 
(-0.39, 0.23) 
0.50 
(0.22, 0.96)  
Absenteeism  
Illiteracy 
-0.01 
(-0.18, 0.14) 
0.17 
(-0.06, 0.52) 
-0.12 
(-0.40, 0.09) 
0.29 
(0.12, 0.56) 
Note: 90% confidence intervals reported in parenthesis. 
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Table 4 
Effect of a one-unit change in the predictors on invalid voting and absenteeism 
under Model 1-b (in percentage points)1,2 
Predictor 
Effect on 
Invalid voting 
Effect  on 
electoral absenteeism 
Illiteracy 
0.09* 
(0.05) 
0.13** 
(0.05) 
Urbanization  
-0.02 
(0.04) 
-0.03 
(0.04) 
Females in EAP 
0.10 
(0.08) 
0.06 
(0.09) 
Candidates per seat 
0.11 
(0.17) 
-0.26 
(0.17) 
Electorate  
0.13** 
(0.06) 
0.07 
(0.06) 
Franchising 
6.15*** 
(2.57) 
1.03 
(2.35) 
Official Ballot 
2.73 
(4.17) 
-5.85 
(8.09) 
Electoral manipulation 
3.37* 
(2.21) 
4.52 
(3.44) 
Growth 
0.67 
(0.45) 
-1.00 
(0.82) 
Inflation 
3.83*** 
(1.24) 
-0.82 
(1.72) 
1
 Standard errors are reported in parenthesis.  
2
 Significance levels: *** 0.01, ** 0.05, *0.1. 
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Figure 6 
Estimated marginal effects of the predictors across models  
(in percentage points) 
 
Note: The graph shows the effect of a one-unit change in each of the predictors on invalid voting 
and electoral absenteeism. The center dots correspond to the point estimates, the thicker lines to 
the 50% confidence interval, and the thinner lines to the 90% confidence interval. 
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Table 5 
Estimates of the Posterior Predictive Loss  
for alternative modeling strategies*  
Model d  
1-b 
2.84 
(2.33, 3.51) 
2 
16.71 
( 13.72, 19.97) 
3 
8.33 
(7.33,  9.44) 
4 
6.59 
( 5.75, 7.55) 
                                 *90% confidence intervals reported in parenthesis. 
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Figure 7  
Actual and expected proportions of invalid voting and electoral absenteeism  
under alternative modeling strategies  
 
 
          Note: The gray circles correspond to the expected proportion of invalid voting  
          and electoral absenteeism for each state-election of the sample for the model  
           under consideration. The  black circles correspond to the actual values.  
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Appendix I - Algorithm implemented to compute the causal effects  
 
Let 
( ){ } ( ){ } ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ){ } ( )( )1 1 1 ,, , , , , , , ,  1,..., ,j jj j j j j jt i i tw j Jη ξη λ δ υ− − −Σ Ω Ω =  denote convergent 
samples generated from (14)-(21). In order to compute the average effect of each of the 
independent variables on invalid voting and electoral absenteeism, the following 
algorithm is implemented (Katz and King, 1999; Bhaumik, Dey and Ravishanker, 2003; 
Gelman and Hill, 2007):      
1. Samples of the estimated expected proportions of invalid voting and absenteeism 
in each district-year for given covariates are calculated using the additive logistic 
transformations (3) and (4):   
                  


 
( )
,( )
, ( ) ( )
, ,
exp
,   1,...,
1 exp exp
I j
i tI j
i t I j A j
i t i t
Y
P j J
Y Y
 
  
= =
   + +      
                    
                  


 
( )
,( )
, ( ) ( )
, ,
exp
,  1,...,
1 exp exp
A j
i tA j
i t I j A j
i t i t
Y
P j J
Y Y
 
  
= =
   + +      
                         
where:  
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
, 0,0 ,0 , , 0, , , , , , 0, , , ,
1 1 1 1 1
,   , ,
K L K L K
s j s j s j s j s j s j s j s j
i t k i t k l t l k l t l i t k t k t i t k i
k l k l k
Y x z z x x s I Aδ δ δ δ η η λ
= = = = =
  
= + + + + + + =  
  
∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑
 
and 
,
,i t tx z  are vectors of observed district-level and country-level predictors.  
 
2. Step 1 is repeated after changing the value of the predictor whose effect is 
analyzed by 1 unit, while keeping all other regressors at their observed levels, 
obtaining 
( )
,
I j
i tP  and 
( )
, ,
A j
i tP 1,...j J= . 
3. The average effect of the predictor on invalid voting and absenteeism for all 
district-years in the sample can be estimated by averaging  
( ) ( )
, ,
I j I j
i t i tP P−  and 
 
( ) ( )
, ,
A j A j
i t i tP P−  over all   1,..., ; 1,..., ; 1,...,i n t T j J= = =  (Bhaumik, Dey and 
Ravishanker, 2003; Gelman and Pardoe, 2007). Confidence intervals summarizing 
the approximate distribution of the causal effects can also be easily constructed 
using standard methods from sampling theory (Gelman and Pardoe, 2007).   
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Appendix II - Alternative strategies to modeling invalid voting and 
electoral absenteeism 
 
Model 2: 
( ), 0 1 2 , 3 , 4 ,
5 , 6 , 7 8
9 10 ,
.
,
s s s s s s
i t t i t i t i t
s s s s
i t i t t t
s s s
t t i t
P Franchising Illiteracy Urbanization FEAP
       Candidates per Seat + Electorate E  Manipulation Ballot
       Growth Inflation        
δ δ δ δ δ
δ δ δ δ
δ δ ε
= + + + + +
+ + +
+ +                                                        s=I,A.
     (II.1) 
 
Model 3: 
, 0, 1, , 2, , 3, ,
,
4, , 5, ,
,
,
s s s s s
i t t t i t t i t t i t
s
i ts s s
t i t t i t i
s
i t
P Illiteracy Urbanization FEAP
       Candidates per Seat + Electorate ,                    s I A
w
β β β β
εβ β λ
= + + + +
+ + =
     (II.2) 
0, 0,0 0,1 0,2 0,3 0,4 0,. ,  ,
s s s s s s s
t t t t t tBallot E Manipulation Growth Inflation s I Aβ δ δ δ δ δ η= + + + + + =   (II.3) 
1, 1,0 1,1 1, ,
s s s s
t t tFranchising                                                                          s I Aβ δ δ η= + + =   (II.4) 
, ,0                                                                                       , ; 2,...,5s sk t k s I A kβ δ= = =   (II.5), 
with  ( ) ( ) ( )2, ,0, , 0, , , .2 2s ss s si t t i tN N p w Gammaε η υ υε σ η υ  Ω =   ∼ ∼  
 
Model 4: 
( ), 0 1 2 , 3 , 4 ,
5 , 6 , 7 8
,
9 10
,
.
s s s s s s
i t t i t i t i t
s s s s
i t i t t t
s
i ts s s
t t i
i
Y Franchising Illiteracy Urbanization FEAP
        Candidates per Seat + Electorate E  Manipulation Ballot
       Growth Inflation
w
δ δ δ δ δ
δ δ δ δ
εδ δ λ
= + + + + +
+ + +
+ + + ,
t
                                             s=I,A
     (II.6) 
With ( ) ( ) ( ), , ,, 0, , , 0, , , ,2 2I A I Ai t i t i i i tN N p w Gammaλ υ υε ε λ λ υ     Σ Ω =       ∼ ∼   
and 
, , ,
,
I A
i t i t i tP P P =   obtained from 
'
, , ,
,
I A
i t i t i tY Y Y =    using (3) and (4). 
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